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REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Letter dated 11 November 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the note dated 26 October 1991 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba addressed to the Interests Section of the United States of America in Havana, and the editorial subsequently published in the Granma daily newspaper, both in reference to recent provocations by armed forces of the Government of the United States stationed at the Guantánamo Naval Base.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the texts annexed thereto circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under agenda item 68.

(Signed) Ricardo ALARCON de QUESADA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Cuba
to the United Nations

Annex I

NOTE DATED 26 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA ADDRESSED TO THE INTERESTS SECTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba presents its compliments to the Interests Section of the United States of America in the Embassy of Switzerland and has the honour to state the following:

Between 1824 and 1852 hours on 23 October 1991, three United States TA-4J aircraft from among those stationed at the Naval Base occupied by the United States in Guantánamo Bay separately and consecutively violated the airspace above Cuba's national territory outside the base.

Two of the aircraft entered Cuban territory outside the base from Puerto Escondido Bay, and the third did so 1,500 metres to the west of the entrance to the bay. All the aircraft exited over the area of the United States post located some 1,750 metres to the north-west of Loma Picote, overflying various Cuban troop positions.

At 0941 hours on 24 October 1991 a United States TA-4J aircraft, from among those stationed at the above-mentioned naval installation, violated the airspace over Cuban national territory outside the base, entering Cuban airspace at a point situated some 2,000 metres to the south-east of the village of Boquerón and exiting some 1,200 metres to the south of the same village, overflying Cuban troop positions in the area.

In each instance the aircraft were engaged in ground attack exercises at the naval base ranges, from which it is clear that the aircraft were armed with heavy weapon loads when they overflew Cuban troop positions.

At 0844 hours on 25 October 1991 a United States TA-4J military aircraft from among those stationed at the Naval Base occupied by the United States in Guantánamo Bay violated Cuban airspace, entering Cuban national territory outside the base at a point situated some 4,500 metres to the north-west of Punta San Nicolas and exiting out to sea some 5,000 metres to the south-west of that same point.

Moments before, the aircraft in question had carried out manoeuvres over the target range at the base, in view of which the possibility that the aircraft was armed cannot be excluded. While over Cuban territory outside the base the aircraft overflew Cuban troop positions in the area.

Between 2010 hours and 2012 hours on 25 October 1991 a United States military CH-53E helicopter from among those recently deployed at the Naval Base occupied by the United States in Guantánamo Bay violated Cuban airspace, which it entered at a point some 3,750 metres to the south-east of the village of Boquerón, flying to a point some 2,000 metres to the north-east of the

village before returning to territory occupied by the base by the same route. During this flight the aircraft overflew various Cuban troop positions.

At the same time aircraft of the same type were taking part in disembarkation exercises at the Base, which suggests that the aircraft which violated Cuban airspace carried assault troops, thus representing a serious threat to the Cuban troops overflown.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba reiterates the dangerous and inadmissible nature of the violations of its national territory by United States combat elements from the territory occupied by the Guantánamo Naval Base, and, in this connection, emphasizes the particular seriousness of the incidents described, which entailed serious risk for the Cuban forces.

The avoidance of similar incidents is entirely the responsibility of the Naval Base authorities.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba takes this opportunity to convey to the Interests Section of the United States of America in the Embassy of Switzerland the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

Havana
26 October 1991

Annex II

EDITORIAL FROM GRANMA

"THE YANKEE BASE AT GUANTANAMO: A CONSTANT SOURCE OF TENSION, PROVOCATION AND AGGRESSIVE MANOEUVRES"

On 1 October, using the situation after the coup d'état in Haiti and the hypothetical need to evacuate North American citizens from that country as a pretext, the United States Government increased the number of combat troops at the Naval Base which it illegally maintains at Guantánamo as well as the number of transport aircraft and helicopters, with the greater part of these reinforcements remaining in this military enclave.

Since their arrival at the Base, these troops have been practising aerial disembarkation techniques every day, using helicopters and CH-53E and C-130 transport aircraft, respectively, both during the day and at night.

At the same time and on the same pretext, the North American navy sent a group of six amphibious vessels, headed by the LPH-12 helicopter carrier, with capacity to transport and disembark a reinforced marine infantry battalion to areas of Haiti, very close to Cuban territory.

It is significant that, simultaneously with the arrival of this United States naval group in the region, warships from other NATO countries appeared in close proximity to Cuba, and some of them entered the Guantánamo Naval Base and unloaded military equipment.

Starting on 21 October, the forces assigned to the Base engaged in a military exercise lasting several days. On this occasion they carried out manoeuvres which clearly revealed the North American authorities' intentions. In what was obviously designed as provocation, they simulated the mass entry of anti-revolutionary Cuban civilians at various points of the frontier and practised the complete evacuation of all North American and foreign civilians residing at the Base.

The reasons given by the naval station's local radio for the entry of supposed dissidents into the Guantánamo Naval Base constituted a clear incitement to the Cuban population living near the Base to leave the country illegally.

The inclusion of a supposed invasion of the base by Cuban citizens coincided with false press, radio and television news reports coming from Florida which announced the alleged intention of the Government of Cuba to clear the minefields and fences from the border perimeter and thus enable a mass exodus of Cubans without visas to travel to the United States. These grotesque inventions included an alleged attack on a North American fishing boat by a vessel of the Cuban Navy, and expanded on the colossal lie that the Cuban Air Force had drawn up plans to attack a nuclear plant in Florida. It was not only the forces permanently stationed at the Guantánamo Naval Base

which took part in all the exercises and manoeuvres on the Yankee base over this period, but also the forces and equipment which had been arriving as reinforcements since 1 October.

These provocative actions are taking place in the context of a resurgence in campaigns against Cuba from the United States, mainly by radio, with open calls for civil disobedience and the physical elimination of our Commander-in-Chief.

As is readily apparent, this all forms part of an overall plan of destabilization and attempts to create a climate of great tension in order to pressurize and intimidate our country.

The provocation from the Yankee naval base is nothing new. Since the triumph of the revolution there have been genuinely bloody incidents such as the torture and interrogation for 24 hours of a Cuban employee on the Base, Manuel Prieto González, on 21 January 1961; the murder of Rubén López Sabariego, also a Cuban worker on the Base, on 30 September 1961, and the torture and assassination of fisherman Rodolfo Rosell Salas by soldiers from the Base in May 1962.

In 1964, on 9 June, a soldier, José Ramírez Reyes, was seriously wounded. Days later, on 19 July, soldier Ramón López Pena was vilely murdered.

On 24 July our forces were once more fired upon, and the soldier Andrés Noel Larduet was wounded.

Two years later, on 21 May 1966, with equal callousness, the soldier Luis Ramírez López was killed.

For 30 years the revolutionary Government has continually had to denounce the violations and provocations of the Naval Base at Guantánamo.

On 10 August 1991, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba sent to the Government of the United States an official note which related a series of violations and provocations carried out by North American military personnel from 13 May onwards, of which the following were highlighted: violation of our airspace, illumination of our troops by spotlight on many occasions, aiming of rifles into our territory, and soldiers exposing their bare buttocks, gesticulating with their genitals and shouting obscene words at our sentries. In the note the Cuban Government stressed once more to the Government of the United States the grave danger which such gross violations and provocations represent and urged it to take appropriate measures to prevent such actions provoking further regrettable incidents.

The Government of the United States confined itself to justifying the violation of our airspace and declared that the other provocations contained in the note from Cuba were totally without foundation. It must be pointed out that the Revolutionary Armed Forces Command has irrefutable proof of many of these provocations.

More recently, during the exercise we described above, TA-4J aircraft permanently based at the Guantánamo Naval Base and a CH-53E helicopter, one of those which had come as reinforcements, violated our airspace, the aircraft on five occasions and the helicopter once.

In the official note submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba to the Government of the United States on 28 October, in addition to a description of the circumstances of each violation which took place between 23 and 25 October, it was pointed out that the aircraft violating Cuban airspace were armed when flying over the positions of Cuban troops, and that the CH-53E helicopter which violated our airspace was part of a group which at that time was carrying out disembarkation exercises inside the base, so it is to be supposed that the helicopter in question was also carrying on board assault troops, thus posing a very real threat to the Cuban troops over which it flew, as did the violations by the TA-4J aircraft.

The note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba reiterated the dangerous and inadmissible nature of the violations of national territory by North American combat units from the territory occupied by the Guantánamo Naval Base was reemphasized, and stressed the gravity of the actions described in this particular case, since they entailed genuine risks for Cuban forces. It was also pointed out that the prevention of similar incidents was entirely the responsibility of the Base authorities.

This whole situation must be placed in the context of increased activity by the United States armed forces in aerial reconnaissance and provocative manoeuvres in areas close to Cuba.

Between 10 July 1991 and now there have been more than 45 surveillance flights by aircraft of various kinds to the north of our western provinces, and on some occasions round our entire territory. Of these 45 surveillance flights, 13 have taken place since 3 October 1991.

It is also highly significant that during IV Party Congress groups of transport aircraft and helicopters with marine landing troops on board took off on several occasions from the Naval Base and manoeuvred south of that facility, which created a situation of heightened military tension in the region and in fact constituted an overt provocation, as well as demonstrating extreme irresponsibility.

North American ships and aircraft of various types are deployed around the clock in the area off our territory, in aircraft-carrier battle groups and amphibious or surface vessel groups. All of them are trying to maintain strict control of the air and sea communications routes and access to our country, while at the same time maintaining an increased military presence in the region as the precursor to possible aggressive action against our country.

Meanwhile, on the continental territory of the United States and in some territories under its control, such as Puerto Rico, as Cuba recently announced to the United Nations General Assembly, extensive exercises and manoeuvres are taking place in which an invasion of Cuba is being rehearsed.

The day of 19 October 1991 was the planned date for the culmination of the exercise which began on 16 September with the large-scale deployment of around 40 units of the 101 Airborne Attack Division at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. The aim of this exercise, involving one of the élite units which had taken part in operation "Desert Storm" in the Arab Persian Gulf, was to train its forces for combat in surroundings similar to those in Cuba against an army using Soviet-style equipment and tactics, at the North American armed forces' combined combat-readiness training centre. With their proverbial arrogance, the Pentagon strategists conceived of the actions in the exercise as a conflict which would gradually escalate from low to medium intensity.

The Yankee Naval Base at Guantánamo is the advance position for the strategy and its primary role is to maintain and eventually increase tension through all kinds of provocation, cynically calculated and meticulously carried out. At the same time, it forms part of the network for systematically monitoring the defensive readiness of our country.

At this moment in time, as has been amply proved by the escalation of provocative and intimadatory actions which have been taking place since last May, the Yankee enclave at Guantánamo is one of the instruments of pressure and threat used by the Government of the United States against the Cuban people and its irrevocable decision to preserve its Homeland, Revolution and Socialism.

We are aware of the danger which this hotbed of tension, provocative actions and aggressive manoeuvres represents for the defence and security of our country. We are also not unaware of the potential value of this enclave for a large-scale operation by the United States armed forces against our country, as a virtual stronghold for the Yankee invaders in our territory.

It is probable that in this increasingly unipolar world it is difficult for the Yankee soldiers in Guantánamo to understand the equanimity and highly professional performance of our brave combatants of the Frontier Brigade, as faithful representatives of the courage, power and conscience of the men and women of our people.

The real risk wrought by the irresponsible actions and military activities designed to intimidate the Yankee occupiers of Guantánamo, is that it is they alone whose nerves may one day fail them.

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LETTER DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE CONTROLLER ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE ON THE PROGRAMME BUDGET IMPLICATIONS OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

My attention has been drawn to the fact that a number of draft resolutions with programme budget implications have given rise to some difficulties in the various Main Committees of the General Assembly. I feel that I ought to share with you some observations.

By section VI of its resolution 45/248 B of 21 December 1990, the General Assembly, inter alia, reaffirmed that the Fifth Committee is the appropriate Main Committee of the General Assembly entrusted with responsibilities for administrative and budgetary matters. It also reaffirmed the role of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and expressed its concern at the tendency of its substantive Committees and other intergovernmental bodies to involve themselves in administrative and budgetary matters.

The budgetary process adopted by the General Assembly under its resolution 41/213 of 19 December 1986 provides that the programme budget include a contingency fund to accommodate additional expenditures derived from legislative mandates not provided for in the proposed programme budget. I would like to recall in that connection that the proposed programme budget for the biennium 1992-1993, which was submitted by the Secretary-General a few months ago, is the outcome of an extensive and complex process of preparation which reflects the collective decision of Member States as expressed in the medium-term plan adopted by the General Assembly for the period 1992-1997. Its programmatic content was reviewed, to the extent possible, by the competent sectoral and regional legislative bodies, prior to its comprehensive review by the Committee for Programme and Coordination at its thirty-first session. For these reasons, it is our understanding that new legislative mandates resulting in programme budget implications and the application of the mechanism of the contingency fund would be of a rather exceptional nature, especially in a budget year.

Lastly, I am concerned at the difficulties which have arisen in implementing a key provision in the new budget process as it relates to the operation of the contingency fund, namely that each statement of programme budget implications should contain a precise indication of how redeployments of resources from low priority areas or modifications of existing activities would be applied in case it is not possible to finance all or part of the additional requirements from the contingency fund. While continuing efforts will be made by this Office and the substantive departments concerned to implement this provision more fully, I believe that the attention of all the members of the Committee should be drawn to the fact that in the absence of such identification, the additional activities which would be mandated by the draft resolution would have to be deferred until a later biennium, should the resources available within the contingency fund be exceeded.

I am keenly aware of the difficulties faced by every Committee in carrying out its programme of work and it is my hope that these observations, rather than complicating your task and that of the Committee, will indeed be of some assistance in the decision-making process. For that reason, I should be most grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Committee.

(Signed) Kofi ANNAN